

Polish Planning Report for Paris Conference 1947

of the International Federation for Housing and Town

Planning

The following report on the methods and procedure adopted in Poland for the realization of the reconstruction plans is divided in three parts.

Part I ~~First part~~ deals with the work done in years 1945 and 1946, based on the method of "organic reconstruction" e.g. by ad hoc reconstruction of the main centres of economic life and activities through the policy of the State subsidies.

Part II ~~Second part~~ gives the description of aims and means adopted in the National Economic Plan of Reconstruction for years 1947 - 1949 and in the Investment Plan for the year 1947.

Part III ~~Third and the last~~ comprises ^a short discussion of the main difficulties foreseen at present and of available means to overcome those difficulties.



A. Reconstruction in Poland in 1945 and 1946.

I General problems.

War devastations.

The object of reconstruction of towns and villages in Poland is to make up for the losses caused by the war activities of 1939 and 1944/45. In this latter period, the Red Army undertook two offensive actions, one in summer and one in winter, separated by five months of trench warfare which took place along the rivers Narew, Vistula and Wisłoka and which resulted in the severe devastation of a large area, stretching through the whole ^{of} Poland in the N-S direction. Another victim was Warsaw, which in 1939 possessed 1.300.000 inhabitants, that is, one - eighth ^h of the total population of Polish towns. Warsaw was destroyed not so much during the two months of Insurrection, as in the period that followed. After the expulsion of the inhabitants the Germans proceeded to destroy systematically houses and streets one after the other.

The great Winter Offensive of the Russian Army, seconded by the Polish Forces, started in January from the line of the Vistula and stopped on the Odra in February. But deadly combats destructive to the country, lasted in Pomerania until the final attack took place in April. Large and small towns suffered devastation, including the two great Baltic harbours: Gdańsk and Szczecin. Wrocław underwent a siege of 3 months' duration, in the outcome of which that city of 700.000 inha-

bitants is in 40 per cent. destroyed.

To all these losses, resulting directly from war activities and frequently made worse, as in the case of Warsaw, by the destructive action of the retreating Germans, there must be added other, less visible, but equally heavy damages, due to the cessation of all building activities ^{and} preservation, however primitive, of buildings.

The number of destroyed dwellings is different in town and country, on the recovered and on the remaining Polish territories; but in every case the ratio is a considerable one.

| Rooms | Towns | | Villages | |
|---|-----------|----------------|-----------|----------------|
| | Dwellings | (in thousands) | Dwellings | (in thousands) |
| 1. Old territories | | | | |
| Status for 1939 | 4.500 | 100% | 3.200 | 100% |
| Losses (approx.) | 1.200 | 27% | 320 | 10% |
| 2. Recovered territories, status for 1939 | | | | |
| Status for 1939 | 4.000 | 100% | 1.000 | 100% |
| Losses (approx.) | 2.500 | 62.5% | 400 | 40% |

The devastation of public buildings amounts to 15 per cent. of the total damage. Primary schools have suffered the loss of 15.000 class-rooms, or 15 million cubic metres. Out of the 1.945.000 hospital beds Poland possessed in 1939, a mere 85.000 ^ewere left.

These few figures give but a very incomplete idea of the devastations in Poland. By destroying public service works, communication centres etc., the Germans often caused serious

difficulties in the normal functioning of towns and villages, thus depriving whole regions of their economic, social and administrative centres.

The total value of the destroyed buildings amounts to 13,5 billion zlotys (value of 1939). This sum is four times larger than the total sum of investments made in 1933, and 13 times larger than the amount spent in the same year on building works. This comparison serves to illustrate the magnitude of the task of reconstruction with which Poland was and is faced after the war.

Problems of reconstruction.

In view of the striking disproportion between the multiple and urgent needs, and the scanty means which the State had at its disposal, the programme of reconstruction had to be specially readjusted. It could not follow the usual preparatory stages: elaboration of plans, organization of technical apparatus, partial preservation of destroyed objects, and clearing up of the debris. It had to direct at once all the modest economic and technical resources at hand as well as all available trained personnel towards the most vulnerable spots of our economic life, with the purpose of rebuilding those elements ^{in order to} ~~enable~~ enable towns and villages to resume their most vital economic, social and cultural functions. Clearance took place only on roads and railway lines of primary importance; indispensable bridges were temporarily repaired; the least destroyed buildings

made fit to accomodate offices; electricity works, water supply and other public services were restored to satisfy the most essential needs of the inhabitants of new centres that were being organized in the midst of ruins, concentrating all that was left of human energy and material resources.

The problem of reconstruction is complicated by the fact that the extent of devastation offers a unique chance of major improvements, a chance that cannot be missed by the simple mechanical restoration of status quo. The territories recently incorporated in the Polish State, and belonging before the War to Germany, require changes before their unification with the rest of the country ~~will~~ be achieved.

The rôle of each town, whether destroyed or intact, must be precisely defined with regard to its dimensions, character of production, transport possibilities etc.

In addition, therefore, to the afore-mentioned primitive and immediate methods of organic reconstruction, a plan was necessary for the development of the whole country as well as detailed plans for the individual regions and towns.

Organization of Reconstruction Authorities.

The activities of the Ministry of Reconstruction, created in May 1945, include all works connected with the building and rebuilding of towns and villages, the erection and administration of State buildings, matters of land, housing and building policies, control of architecture, organization of home production of building materials, and organization of building

enterprises. The Minister of Reconstruction, Professor Dr. Michael Kaczorowski, is at the same time, in charge of the physical planning of the whole country as the Chairman of the Central Office of Physical Planning. The Institute of Building Research to the Ministry of Reconstruction is entrusted with solving scientific problems of construction.

Beside these central authorities, secondary offices have been organized as the Regional Departments of Reconstruction and Regional Offices of Physical Planning. All these organizations form part of the Regional Government. At the lowest level Local Authorities have their own offices. In the areas of the particularly high degree of devastation there exist special Agencies for Reconstruction, dependent directly from the Minister. Problems pertaining to the reconstruction of Warsaw called for yet another form of organization: namely there was organized the Bureau for ^{the} Reconstruction of Warsaw.

Elements of reconstruction: human, material and technical.

Before the war Poland possessed 160.000 trained building workmen, constituting 60 per cent. of the total of building workmen. In June 1946 the number of building workers/employed ^{actually} in all the towns amounted to 86.000, of which 50.000 were more or less trained (the inclusion of ~~untrained~~ ^{rural craftsmen} would raise this figure to 65.000). This shows that, in spite of the heavy war losses (reducing the total number of workers by 25-30 per cent.) - there is ~~unavailable~~ ^(temporarily otherwise employed) sufficient labour/available for

building works. There is however a pronounced shortage of civil engineers, architects and other technicians, as the intellectual classes suffered the greatest losses during the war. In view of the anticipated rapid increase of building works in the next few years, to overcome this shortage is a matter of extreme importance. Special schools of different grade have been maintained for this purpose or created, as well as special courses for the training of qualified workers.

The production of the second element of reconstruction — materials — has been largely reduced owing to the destruction of a number of factories and plants. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that ^{the} lack of materials for the time being actually hampers the process of building. Less heavily damaged plants have been rapidly repaired, and production figures are rising. ^{The} Market has been organized by the Central Office of Building Materials (created by the Ministry of Reconstruction) comprising State and municipal factories together with cooperative societies.

The third element of reconstruction — technical means — were at the start very inadequate, owing to lack of tools and machines and to the very character of the works, which consisted of small and medium-scale repairs, the mechanization of which was impracticable. This problem is an important one, as the growing volume of building works must be provided for, and in view of the devastation of forests and brick-yards bricks and timber ~~mm~~ should by other materials. ~~my~~ be replaced. Every effort was made to import the necessary

modern machines - partly through the intermediary of U.N.R.R.A. partly by the purchase from the English and American demobilization stocks or from Sweden and Switzerland; finally a certain amount was supplied as a gift by the U.S.S.R. There is a special office to deal with their distribution, leasing them to the building enterprises.

Long-term schemes. Plan of the physical development of the country.

The extent of devastation, as well as the need to unify the two parts of the country which till to-day possessed an utterly different economic, social and cultural structure, called for the preparation of a new comprehensive plan for the country as a whole. To meet this purpose, the Central Office of Physical Planning was created, and an Act was issued on the Physical Development of the Country. This Act defines the scope of national, regional and local plans, and the organization of central and subordinate authorities; it establishes the mode of preparation and approval of ^{of} ^{the} plans.

II. Reconstruction of Warsaw.

After the failure of the Insurrection in October 1944, the Germans undertook an almost total evacuation of the city. On the left bank, ⁱⁿ the dominant part of the Capital, there were but 2000 people left scattered in the suburbs. These had to witness the systematic destruction of the city by the Germans, which did not cease until January 17, 1945 when the Polish

troops and the Red Army crossed the Vistula and entered the destroyed capital. .

Out of 16.300 buildings, 9.100 were destroyed beyond repair, 3.000 were burnt down but still fit for rebuilding, and only 4.200 were less damaged and could be made habitable after minor repairs. All the city was mined, streets were blocked up by debris, there was no water, no electricity, no transport. In spite of all this, the inhabitants were rapidly streaming back. The decision of the Government to transfer all State authorities and central offices back to Warsaw had the most stimulating influence.

In May 1945, two months after the liberation, the population of left-bank Warsaw has reached 132.000. The joint population on both banks amounted to 313.000, that is, 25 per cent of the pre-war figure. In April the first houses obtained electric light, in May water was supplied, in July the first tramways. Every effort was made to restore the most indispensable services, so that Warsaw could resume her metropolitan functions. Office-buildings were reconstructed, communication revived, public utility works put in working condition. The rebuilding of dwellings came to the foreground only when the country began to realize that the capital was indeed again its administrative centre.

The re-birth of Warsaw is a classical and imposing example of "organic" reconstruction; the future residents were freely admitted into the city at the same time as the building teams.

As a result of this, in February 1946 the population of Warsaw amounted to 476.000 (36 per cent. of the pre-war status), and occupied 219.000 rooms, or 33 per cent. of the pre-war figure. Till July 1946 2.6 million cubic metres ~~in~~ were rebuilt at the State's expense. The city possesses 13 active tramway lines (as compared to 33 in 1939), and 3 trolley-bus lines. ^{The} Municipal plant supplies electricity for 7.840 buildings, the quantity ^{per} capita being the double of the pre-war (333 KWH, in 1939 - 167 KWH). Already 40% of buildings are supplied with ^{water} and sewers. The number of hospital beds is 40% of the pre-war amount.

Two facts enabled the Bureau of Reconstruction to complete this great effort of rebuilding public services to meet the needs of rapidly increasing population: the first was, that in 1945 - 70 per cent. and in 1946 - 40 per cent of the funds destined for the reconstruction of the country were spent on Warsaw; the second - that the rebuilding of housing was temporarily left in the background. The expenditure of the Bureau of Reconstruction for the reconstruction of dwellings amounted in 1945 to 17,7%, and in 1946 to 24,6% only of the funds at its disposal. In 1947 50% are destined for that purpose.

Housing conditions in Warsaw are extremely difficult. In 1939 the average density was 2 persons per room, in 1946 it is 2,2, and on the left bank as much as 2,4 persons per room. Many people live in half - demolished or primitively patched - up houses. Before the progress of reconstruction will achieve any change and reduce the average density to about 1,8 persons per

room, special steps had to be taken to guarantee as fair a distribution of the available floor-space as possible. The distribution and administration of housing in Warsaw was entrusted to the Town Authorities under the Compulsory Administration of Premises and Rent Control Act. The Municipality allots rooms and flats. Standards were published at the same time stating the ratio of floor-space per person.

The war disaster in Warsaw has set new problems before the architect and the town-planner. The city could be rebuilt on the old lines using the pattern of old streets and preserved foundations of buildings. This would mean perpetuation of old errors dating from the 19th Century - a period of rapid and chaotic growth. On other hand^a possibility for new Warsaw has arisen. Only the most valuable features of the former city could and will ~~remain~~ be preserved. The realization of a bold plan demanded some solution of the problem of the land property. It was decided that the ownership of land would be transferred to the Warsaw City Corporation. The former owners preserve the right of building on their land or may apply for a long-term lease of that land. In case of land being zoned for open spaces the owner obtains the right of building or lease on land of similar value situated elsewhere. The ownership of buildings is totally respected and where demolition is necessary, the Municipality is to pay ~~the~~ full compensation.

III. Reconstruction of other towns.

The privileged position of Warsaw in the matter of subsi-

dies and credits could not remain without influence on the reconstruction of provincial towns. Nevertheless, work was being done in the towns of Central Poland on no smaller scale, thanks to the vitality and financial possibilities of their inhabitants less affected by the war catastrophe. The towns situated on the Western territories are in an altogether different position. Those towns became depopulated in the course of war activities and are at present inhabited by re-emigrants from the areas East of the river Bug, by former victims of German deportation, and by refugees from Warsaw and other destroyed cities. The number of these inhabitants is considerable, but their economic means very limited. The financial aid from the State to towns /Warsaw excepted/ amounted in 1945/46 to 2.1 billion ^{zlotys,} a sum obviously out of proportion with the needs. However, the results were relatively considerable.

In four largest cities, Poznań (devastated in 33%), Wrocław (40%), Gdańsk (55%) and Szczecin (30%) special ^{Agencies for} ~~institutions of~~ Reconstruction were created.

The example of Wrocław may serve to illustrate the results achieved by those ^{Agencies,} ~~Bureaus~~ Wrocław is situated on the Recovered Territories and possesses at present about 190.000 inhabitants. Of 179 schools 116 were destroyed 50 per cent and more and of the rest none was left completely undamaged. Four secondary, 9 professional, 31 primary and 12 Kindergarten schools were rebuilt and reopened. Special attention has been given to the University and Technical College; 63 buildings were repaired and both institutions resumed their activities in autumn

1945. Eighteen hospitals were rebuilt and put in use. The reconstruction of the power plants permitted the supply of electricity; between May and June 1945 the supply increased by 50% (= 6 million KWH); water mains were repaired in 634 places, and 272 Km of them are by now in use supplying water to 5000 houses. The city transport consists of 5 tramway and 4 bus lines, although in May 1945 the whole network was completely destroyed, the streets encumbered with debris to an extent that made them inaccessible even to pedestrians, and all the cars (which served as barricades during the siege) destroyed. Out of the three main bridges two are rebuilt, and out of 10 railway lines 9 are functioning again.

An Act, issued in October 1945, determines among others that rents in houses rebuilt or repaired by their owners are not subject to the rent limitations. The same Act deals with another special aspect of post-war conditions in Poland. Due to the German policy of extermination, 4 million inhabitants of towns (including 3 million Jews) were killed or deported. As a result of this, 50% town houses were left without owners. The reconstruction of all abandoned dwellings surpasses the State's possibilities. Frequently the owner, although present, lacks sufficient means for ^{the} reconstruction of his house. In such cases the Act provides that a cooperative society, a body of future tenants, a municipality or a public institution may undertake the repairs. The building then remains under the management of such a body. Municipalities and public institutions

are entitled to the use of the building until full amortization of the costs is obtained, in the remaining cases the owner recovers his rights not later than after 10 years.

All these methods serve to stimulate reconstruction, but their results are not sufficient to provide housing for all. The State must therefore undertake the reconstruction of housing on a much larger scale. In the following years this problem will become one of special prominence.

IV. Reconstruction of villages.

The changes which occurred in Polish villages and farms after the war are greater than in any other sector of economic life. Reconstruction must not only cover the loss of 400,000 farms destroyed during the war. It must also provide for the needs which arose in result of the agrarian reform and the subdivision of ^{it} entailed land, both on old and recovered territories. In consequence every reconstructed village should at the same time be re-planned. To forward their modernization, State subsidies are granted to villages in the following order:

1. Villages with already approved plans of reconstruction.
2. Villages, the plans of which are being prepared.
3. Villages, the plans of which are to remain unchanged.
4. All other villages.

Farms with less than 3 hectares of land are not rebuilt by the State, except model farms or those in the vicinity of towns, producing vegetables and fruits.

Owing to difficulties of organization, farms obtained in the first year only 10 per cent. of the total grants for reconstruction. In 1946 these were raised up to 35% of the total. In comparison with needs this too was insufficient. In these conditions the State is able to rebuild on each farm only one building. It will have to serve as temporary shelter both for the farmer and for his livestock. This is based on an assumption that once the farm starts production the owner will be able to erect other necessary buildings. This is another example of the limitations which had to be imposed on the programme of rural reconstruction.

At present a portion of preparatory work has been already completed, namely:

1. Local production of building materials has been revived and encouraged (small brick works, precast concrete units factories, quarries etc.) to replace timber.
2. Training was organized for masons and their apprentices specially ^{them} / to teach how to take advantage of local materials.
3. Typical designs of farm buildings have been prepared, adapted to the character of different regions and to various building materials.

Direct help was given by the State in the form of building materials and bank loans. So far 30.000 farmsteads were rebuilt. But ~~the~~ experience has shown that all this help was insufficient, particularly in the areas of intense devastations. On the great battlefields along the Narew, Vistula and Wisłoka not only single

farms, but whole villages must be built anew. Such an action requires powerful/financial means and organized transport of building materials from other parts of the country.

First aid was given in autumn 1945 for the inhabitants who were living in dug-outs. Barracks were erected to give shelter to 10.000 families. A number of provisional schools in these barracks was also provided.

In January 1946 a Central Committee for Rural Reconstruction was entrusted with the work in those devastated areas.

Reconstruction of less devastated areas takes place on a much smaller scale. In the next year special concentration of efforts on the reconstruction of the Recovered Territories is contemplated. Undestroyed or slightly damaged farms in these areas are already occupied, but a considerable number of completely devastated buildings require thorough repairing.

Simultaneously, problems of new construction are being studied to evolve modern types of farm buildings.

Summary of expenditures and results of reconstruction.

Two periods may be discerned in the financing of reconstruction, before and after April 1. 1946. In the first period, preliminaries and expenses were made in terms of from one to three months' periods, in the second, financial plans were prepared for the remainder of the year 1946. The nine-months' preliminary became possible because the initial organization of reconstruction was already completed. Increase of work follows the increase

of production and of national income.

The credits of the Ministry of Finance put at the disposal of the Ministry of Reconstruction were spent as follows:

| | Till March 31, 1946 | April 1 - December 31, 1946 |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Warsaw | 70% | 40% |
| Other towns | 20% | 25% |
| Villages and farms | 10% | 35% |

The reconstruction of Warsaw will not suffer from this change of percentage, as the absolute value of credits is increasing.

The characteristic changes are illustrated by another table showing the distribution of subsidies for the different types of work:

| | Till March 31, 1946 | April 1 - December 31, 1946 |
|---|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Demolitions, clearing of streets and communication lines, preservation of buildings, preparatory works | 23% | 5% |
| 2. Reconstruction of public establishments | 18% | 16% |
| 3. Construction of dwellings and farm buildings | 25% | 45% |
| 4. Other construction | 34% | 34% |

The subsidies of the Ministry of Reconstruction were directed to meet the needs of the State and of Local Authorities; they were also given to private persons, especially farmers, and used for the provision of housing. By help in the mobilization of private means, they accelerated the whole process of reconstruction.

It is difficult to estimate the actual results of reconstruction in the first year. 40 per cent of the subsidies were spent on clearing and on the repairs of public utilities (electric and gas works, water supply, sewerage). The effect of these ~~on~~ works cannot be expressed in figures. And yet these results are considerable, for within a year all large and medium - sized towns in Poland could resume their life. On the Recovered Territories 13 electric works, 156 water-supply and sewage systems, 4 gas works and 37 slaughter-houses ~~and~~ were brought back in use. The same subsidies permitted the reconstruction of 40.000 rooms for offices and schools, and ~~another~~ ^{another} 20.000 for residential purposes. Over 60.000 rooms were rebuilt at the expense or with the help of the State providing accomodation for 120.000 people.

30.000 farmsteads were erected with State assistance, as well as barracks with 2.000 rooms. The amount of employed material and data concerning labour justify the opinion that private enterprise stimulated by the activity of the State in the reviving centres achieved at least the same results.

The second season closed ^{by} the winter 1946-47 ~~is~~ provided about 20.000 rooms for residential purposes,

about 6.000 office rooms,

5.000.000 cubic metres of school buildings,

200.000 cubic metres of hospital buildings,

300.000 cubic metres for various purposes.

and ~~programmes~~ the reconstruction of about 60.000 farms, together with the provision of barracks ^{with} of 15.000 rooms.

It is expected that private enterprise will double these figures. If one remembers the extremely hard conditions in which this work was undertaken, the exhaustion of the people, and the inadequacy of the means at their disposal, the results achieved must be regarded as considerable, proving that ^{the} adopted methods were on the whole satisfactory.

B. The Basic Principles of the Plan of Reconstruction.
for 1947 - 1949.

Before discussing the principles of the Investments Plan of the Ministry of Reconstruction, the method used in its preparation~~x~~ should be explained.

Method accepted for the plan of the Ministry of Reconstruction.

A plan arises as a comparison of estimated investment needs on the one hand and the estimated possibilities of their realization on the other hand. With regard to the Investments Plan of the Ministry of Reconstruction the estimate of needs is based on the following factors:

a) the estimate of pre-war capital in buildings and amenities coming under the sphere of activities of the Ministry of Reconstruction;

b) the estimate of losses caused by war destructions and the de-capitalization up to the date ^{when} (the plan) ^{be} ^{valid.} ~~comes into force;~~

c) estimate of further losses through de-capitalization during the period of the plan;

d) estimate of population at completion of the plan;

e) the rules laid down for the area under consideration by physical planning (eg. the demands for the proper location of industries, re-planning of nets of communication, et c.).

The careful examination of the living-space and equipment standards approved for the period of planning (eg. desired density of population per room, the number of schools et c.) ^{permits} ~~allows~~ an

estimate to be made of the need for investments. This forms a programme of postulated investments, expressed in cubic metres, the length of roads et c.).

On the other hand the estimate of the possibilities of realisation is based

- a) on the fluctuation of the national income and an estimate of its share destined, in our case, for building investments;
- b) on the estimate of other means of realization such as building materials, ^{tools and} implements, man - power et c.

A comparison of the data provided by these sources ^{permits} allows an estimate of the maximum of investments we ^{shall} ~~will~~ be able to undertake.

Now we can confront the needs with the possibilities of realization, which in our case unfortunately shows a preponderance of needs over the possibilities. This is not only because of the general pauperisation and the diminution of the national income, but also because in the National Economic Plan the main stress during the first 3-year period is laid on the reconstruction for consumption, and as a rule the building investments are promoted only where necessary for the increase of production.

The reduction of the plan to the extent of the possibilities may be done either through a possible revision of the fixed standards or through the selection of the intended investments according to the priority of the needs. It should be noted here that the lowering of standards should not go beyond a certain biological minimum of ~~meeting~~ ^{meeting} the needs, because then

the investments themselves become useless. It is believed that the proper way here is to concentrate on some main sectors and eliminate the works which are not of primary importance or which do not guarantee quick effects.

The scarcity of available resources makes this eliminating process specially important, and the sectors for concentration of works should be chosen very carefully and strongly based not only on the economic considerations, but also on considerations of social and political questions.

Detailed Principles of the Plan.

After these introductory notes we can pass now to a discussion of these principles of elimination which guided us in our endeavour to bring our plan within the boundaries set by the real possibilities.

I. Reconstruction of Warsaw and other towns.

Thesis No.1. The building investments in towns should be concentrated in the most destroyed and most active towns, enabling them to perform their normal functions, important from the political, social, cultural, and economical points of view. Such investments should especially be undertaken in Warsaw, Szczecin, Gdańsk, Poznań and Wrocław, in the towns of the ^{Upper Silesian} coal-mining district and in the small towns of the Western Recovered Territories which form the indispensable economical, social and cultural centres for the rebuilding and reviving of that ^{part of the} country.
side.

It should be noted here that besides the group of big cities, where no additional argumentation is necessary, a special stress should be laid on the investments in smaller cities and towns on the Recovered ^{Territories} ~~lands~~, where these centres ^{perform} have a special ly important rôle in the activities of rural settling. They form the centres of services for the rural areas and thus are of primary ^{importance} necessity to the development of agricultural production. In the last period these smaller centres in the Recovered Territories were handicapped in comparison to the bigger cities, but this was caused by the fact that our first task was to set in motion the administrative machinery of the country. Now is the time to make up for these past deficiencies.

Thesis No.2. The building investments should be undertaken according to the quickness of effects obtained, making the maximum use of the buildings with slight degree of damage. New buildings, except for building of experimental character, should be undertaken only after the exhaustion of all buildings available for reconstruction, (as for instance in the towns of the ^{Upper Silesian} coal district.)

All building foreseen for reconstruction should be at least ^{protected from} secured against further destruction. To avoid any misunderstandings it is necessary to stress here that we have not ignored the fact that the ^{advantage} ~~profitableness~~ of renovation works as compared with new buildings ^{is questionable} may be questioned because of the smaller productiveness of work, greater difficulties in rational organization and the comparatively greater percentage of skilled labour needed for repairs. This thesis, however, was included among our guiding principles, in spite of these drawbacks, because

the number of comparatively little damaged buildings, especially in the towns of the Recovered ^{Territories} ~~lands~~ is so great that if repairs and preserving works were not undertaken, ^a the great part of the national wealth would be ruined.

In the cities so thoroughly destroyed, as for instance Warsaw, the repairs undertaken already in 1947 consist mainly of houses destroyed to such an extent that their reconstruction is equal to new building. Namely in the houses destroyed to over 60-70 p.c., the cost of materials recovered from the ruins equals the cost of the demolition works, so that the starting point is the same as for a new building.

Thesis No.3. Repair works as well as all new buildings should be planned on the base of building standards, both for area and equipment, fixed at a minimal ^{um} level.

The idea of the building standards is not yet very popular in the Polish technical circles and is often identified with optimal standards. It should therefore be explained here that the building standards fix the level of meeting the needs with regard to space and equipment of buildings, which should correspond to the minimal ^{um} biological and functional demands; its top limit is fixed by the existing economic possibilities. It follows that the standards are flexible and should change according to the changes of the general economic situation. The period of validity of standards will therefore be adjusted to the term of the economic plan.

The Ministry of Reconstruction has already specified the

cubic standard for housing, fixing the maximum of surface allowed for individual dwellings built from government funds.

Thesis No.4. The chief building investments will be confined to housing. Their extent should be dependent upon the foreseen increase of population, connected with the opening of new establishments and enlarging of the old ones. The increase of population in Warsaw for the end of 1949 is estimated at 700 thousands. While planning the housing investments, the possibilities of the co-operative building and of private ^{enterprise} initiative should be fully taken into consideration.

The already mentioned policy to set the administrative machinery in motion as quick as possible caused in the past administrative building to have priority. Now, after having met the most urgent needs in this respect we switch more and more to housing. In the ensuing 3 year period, therefore, the percentage of housing investments in the total of the plan is constantly increasing, while the percentage of administrative building is steadily decreasing.

Thesis No.5. Investments in the sector of cultural and educational building should be planned on the assumption that the raising of the standard of living of the working masses should also include the increase in consumption of cultural values.

Thesis No.6. Investments in the sphere of public utilities and especially in water supply should help in the fight with the epidemics and social diseases.

Thesis No.7. The public administration buildings should be

reduced to the most indispensable minimum, with complete exclusion of new building if it is at all possible to obtain the necessary cubage for the purpose by repairing existing damaged buildings. Thesis No. 3. Buildings of historical and artistic value should be fully protected against further destruction. Their reconstruction should be carried on taking into consideration their future usefulness.

As can be ~~seen~~^{seen} from the above theses, the general trend is for extreme economy and the meeting of needs as far as possible by repairing and rebuilding the existing damaged buildings, avoiding whenever possible new building.

In the sector for buildings of historical value the main stress is laid on protecting ~~ing~~^{on} against further destruction of buildings in the Recovered Territories. This inequality may be compensated in the Old ~~lands~~^{Territories} by adapting the old buildings where possible to modern purposes and thus finding additional resources for their reconstruction.

II. The reconstruction of the Countryside.

Thesis No. 1. The building investments in the countryside should be planned with a view to their economic effect, that is the increase of the rural production. In particular they should include the building up of farms formed as result of the agrarian reform and the rebuilding of destroyed farms in districts where the rational economic development is assured by the quality of soil, size of the farm et c.

Thesis No.2. The building of new farms and the rebuilding of the totally destroyed ones should be limited to one building per farm part^{ly} used as dwelling and part^{ly} as farm house.

Thesis No.3. The building investments in the countryside should be concentrated chiefly in the destroyed districts of the Recovered Territories and in the area of great devastations along the rivers Narew, Wisła and Wisłoka.

Thesis No.4. The organization of building in the countryside should make full use of private ^{enterprise} ~~initiative~~ and the economic conditions of the countryside. State help should, if possible be limited to provision of building materials, organization and training.

Thesis No.5. The building investments undertaken by the State in the sphere of agriculture should be limited to the most indispensable ones from the economic point of view.

Thesis No.6. The rules for the planning of building for social purposes should be the same as those applied in the towns. At the same time it should be stressed that the building for social purposes in the countryside, where the housing standards are low, forms the essential supplement to the dwelling houses. The inadequate living space and housing equipment allowed per person compels them to meet some of their needs communally, in social organizations, such as communal laundries, recreation halls, kindergartens et c.

As the standards of individual dwellings get higher, these arrangements will steadily lose their purely economical aspect and will gradually become centres of social and cultural life.

III. Building Industry.

Thesis No.1. The investments in the building materials industry should enable the production of these materials in the quantities necessary to carrying out the plans of all Government Departments, plus the foreseen building activities of the Cooperative movement and private ^{enterprise} initiative. The fact that so far we did not feel the lack of building materials can be explained by the existence of stocks of materials left by the Germans (now almost completely exhausted) or ^{coming} derived from the demolition works. But we are quite aware that the success of the Plan depends on bringing the building materials industry to full production level. The reconstruction of productive establishments will reach its climax already in the second year of the plan and will slightly decrease in the third year.

The placing of the main investing effort on the industry of building materials in the first stage of the plan will enable an increase in production of these materials, beginning already in the second half of 1947 year.

Thesis No.2. Both the building materials industry and the actual process of building should be rationalized and mechanized by means of special investments, so as to enable a considerable reduction in the cost of building in the period of the next economic plan.

IV. Experimental building and Studies.

Thesis No.1. In order to modernise the methods of building and to reduce its cost, it is necessary to facilitate technological studies and investigate the merits and draw-backs of different constructions by promoting building of experimental character.

Thesis No.2. The extensive building action in the next planning period should be prepared after broad studies in physical and economic planning and experimenting in various types of buildings. It may be said even that the less means we have for current works the more we should spend on studies and experiments. We should profit from the comparatively slack period in building and prepare the extensive building action, based on all the achievements of modern building technique. The repairs carried on in the traditional way do not give us the opportunity to introduce new ideas in rationalisation and mechanisation of work. Therefore all new buildings should be used for experimental purposes.

Structure of the Plan for 1947.

The investments plan of the Ministry of Reconstruction ^{is} ~~arose~~ as the result of the above considerations.

The Plan is divided into 5 parts. The first one deals with Warsaw and consists ^{of} 25 p.c. of the total sum foreseen for investments. This clearly illustrates our attitude towards the Capital of the country. It should be remembered that in the first period of our ^{reconstruction} ~~activity~~ Warsaw consumed up to 3/4 of capitals invested in buildings. In the plan for 1946 (three quarters of the year) the position of Warsaw was reduced to about 1/3

and is ^{further} ~~still~~ reduced to only about 1/4 in the plan for 1947. This is due to the fact that the most essential needs of the Capital, connected with the location and functioning of central authorities have already been met and that now the community itself will have to help and collaborate at the rebuilding of the destroyed city.

The second part -"other towns"-comprises about 40 p.c. of the total sum, whereas the reconstruction of the countryside (third part) comprises about 25 p.c. ^{The} fourth group of investments, the industry of building materials, consumes 8 p.c., and the remainder of about 2 p.c. is foreseen for experimental building, studies and plans. It should be noted that the percentage shown here for the "countryside group" is not exact, because, as has already been stated the centres of services are partly comprised in the towns. The countryside also benefits from the part of investments made in the building materials industry, where a special stress is laid on the development of the local industries. Housing investments comprise about 35 p.c. of the plan that is more than half of the total credits for investments in the towns. As it has already been mentioned this figure will constantly increase in the years 1947-49.

It may be interesting to compare the building activity of the Ministry of Reconstruction with the activities of other investors in the building market. The total sum foreseen for investments by the Ministry of Reconstruction (excluding the sums foreseen for foreign purchases) amounts to about 15 milliards

zlotys. Other Governments Departments building independently, such as the Ministry of National Defence, of Industry (the industrial buildings), Communication, Shipping et c. will in 1947 require # ~~all~~ together a similar ^{amount} sum. Finally private initiative and the co-operative movement in its part not comprised in the plan will use, according to approximate estimates, about 10-12 milliards zlotys. Thus the total of building activities in 1947 may be estimated at about 40 milliards zlotys. This sum seems very low, because it is still below the rate of amortisation of buildings. This means that in 1947 we will not be able yet to stop the process of decapitalisation. As compared however with the pre-war situation it will be seen that the capital invested in buildings in 1947 will reach about 3/4 of the capital invested then for the same purpose. It gives us also a higher "per capita" figure. This proves that we are planning on realistic lines but that at the same time the execution of the plan will require a great effort of the whole population as well as of the coordinating authority.

The building policy in the economical structure
of Poland

The Polish economic system is in the period of conscious switching over to the methods of planned economy as is obvious from the 3 year plan now in preparation.

The Planned economy demands that all economical and social phenomena be directed according to plan. This is not difficult if all the economical and social initiative rest within the

State. Our system, however, foresees the co-existence of two other factors besides the State, namely the co-operative movement and private ^{enterprise} ~~initiative~~. These factors are only indirectly subjected to the leadership of the planning authority and the economic phenomena occurring within their sphere of activities can be foreseen in the plan only approximately, and the extent of the inaccuracy will depend, besides the difficulty of foreseeing, also on the extent of the State's interference.

The above mentioned difficulties occur even more distinctly in building ^{activities}. This can be understood if we remember that in ^{present} our economic pattern in industry for instance, the mutual relationship of the three sectors - State, Co-operative Movement and private ^{enterprise} ~~initiative~~ is clearly defined, while no such definition exists so far with respect to building, and especially to housing. There is at present no legal act which would lay down complete and unquestionable rules regarding the rights and duties of those investing in building. The present fragmentary rules will, however, be revised by a new Housing Act, which has already been prepared. The legalization of these rules will regulate the present non-coordinated activity of private ^{enterprise} ~~initiative~~, where most people ^{were} willingly investing their capital in buildings securing quick profits, but not necessarily being the most desirable from the point of view of the plan of reconstruction.

The organization of buildings itself should also be regulated, fixing the ^{mutual} relationship of the co-existing State,

co-operative and private building establishments. The efforts of the Ministry of Reconstruction in the sphere of building policy should therefore lie in two directions. In the State sector it should be the task of the Ministry of Reconstruction to unify the rules of the organisation of building ^{activities} set by other State Departments. With regard to the co-operative sector and private initiative the Ministry should endeavour to create a situation in which all investments undertaken by these two sectors develop according to the rules laid down in the state plan with regard to location and type of building. The way to obtain this aim is not by laying down of prohibiting rules, ^{but} on the contrary, ^{by stressing} the rights and privileges which will be available on condition of compliance with the rules of the State building policy ~~should be stressed~~.

C. Foreseen difficulties in the realization of the Plan.

The difficulties which the realization of the plan of reconstruction will encounter are not easy to define. Certain conclusions however may be drawn from ~~an~~ observations of the tendencies to be seen at present.

Assuming that the present executive machinery of the State Administration, and the Ministry of Reconstruction, with its branches in particular, are capable to cope with the problems set forth by the prepared plans of reconstructions, it ~~should~~ ^{may} be ~~assumed~~ ^{assumed} that the main difficulties will arise in the "outside world" in the form of all sort of opposition and resistance during the actual realization of the plan.

Among many of the foreseen difficulties the following appear to be the most important:

- 1/ greater building activity in the reconstruction of the less destroyed centres, than in more devastated areas,
- 2/ tendency to rebuild on the old site;
- 3/ the investing activity of other authorities and institutions besides the Ministry of Reconstruction;
- 4/ lack of ^{5?} coordination between private ^{eulerpax} initiative and the plan of reconstruction.

With regard to point 1 already in 1946 some difficulties have arisen in the proper development of the rebuilding activity in the most destroyed areas. It is difficult to start there an active and economically sound development. There is no spontaneous reconstruction, because there is no economic justifi-

cation for its development. Also the cost of building is much greater than in the other parts of the country, because the building materials have often to be transported from longer distances, and it is usually necessary to provide transport for the workmen from other localities or provide temporary dwellings for them. Thus the reconstruction of the badly destroyed areas ^{entails} ~~incurs~~ much greater efforts in organisation and much larger expenses by the State than the reconstruction of the less damaged districts. This is especially evident on the Recovered Territories where the figures of density of population reflected for a long time the percentage of the buildings in use. In the southern district untouched by the war, these figures were actually higher than before the war.

The second difficulty in the realisation of the rational plan of reconstruction is the general tendency to rebuild on the old spot and in the previous form. This is due to both emotional reasons and to the more or less reasoned individual economic concepts. The preserved part of the building such as for instance the basements or some other elements of the old structure ^{constitutes} ~~makes~~ a temptation to rebuild on exactly the same lines. To this temptation yield not only private individuals, but also institutions. In such cases the foreseen individual gains and savings should be compared with the social and communal gains and needs. It is the aim of ~~the~~ planned economy to create conditions in which the gains of the individuals are obtained by full coordination with the collective needs of the community.

The third of the foreseen difficulties is the fact that beside the Ministry of Reconstruction other Government Departments will also carry on building investments which may either conform with or counteract the principles of the plan. An example of these difficulties is the building of lines of communication opening prematurely certain districts, whereas at the same time other districts already well provided with dwelling houses lack adequate communication.

Similarly, there is the question of lack of coordination between the new industrial establishments created without due regard to the existing or planned housing settlements, or new residential districts built without regard to the existing place of work or suitable social centres.

The last of the foreseen difficulties is the harmonising of the tendencies of private initiative with the aims of the Government plan. As has already been mentioned it is not the intention of the Polish economic system to exclude the investing activity of private ^{enterprise} initiative. It is treated as one of the necessary elements of the economic life of the country and therefore the application of any discouraging methods would be improper. The inducement of private initiative into the sphere of planned economy will depend on the creation of specially attractive conditions. The main tool of ^{such} ~~this~~ policy ^{should} ~~must~~ be proper legislative ^{ion} ~~acts~~ ^{providing for} ~~increasing~~ reduction in rates and taxes, allotment of ground or reduced rent or ^{other} favourable condi-

tions of building.

All the above difficulties may be overcome by a firmly carried investment and building policy.

The proper management of the elements of direct and indirect state control and policy should therefore ensure the development of economic processes towards the desired achievement - full realisation of the prepared plans of reconstruction.

Report prepared for the Polish Town
Planning Institute by A. Andrzejewski,
K. Dziewoński and J. Goryński.

