


Figure 16-8. The integration of civilization markets



to accomplish. It is a long-term positive outlook which offers hope to the world's masses.

The world market in 2020 will not be saturated. The 162 countries comprising the "rest of the world" will be markets for FTAA and FTAAT, China, and Japan. The economic prospects for the world look good. In the next 20 years, the world economy will grow 100% and GNP per capita will also grow rapidly, especially in the developing countries.

However, there are potential "flies in the ointment." These predictions assume a world without major wars (either between countries or between ideologies) or economic disasters. But strong economic performance, coupled with continued increase in the world population (an increase of 1.7 billion—almost 30%), will cause continued deterioration of the environment. And the development of the global economy will pass through crises such as the one experienced in East Asia in the late 1990s, or even worse.

The proliferation of Internet access will open intriguing scenarios. On the one hand, windows of opportunity will be offered for developing

markets (e.g., India and Brazil already have booming software-development industries). Also, ready access to the communication and information opportunities provided by the Internet may help stimulate education, improve health, and encourage entrepreneurs—thereby improving living standards and stimulating the economies. On the other hand, the dissemination of information, together with the ready access to free worldwide communication, can abet terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. Also, as widespread cyber-attacks have shown, the Internet is open to abuse—from anywhere in the world (Targowski & Korth, 2003).

THE CIVILIZATIONAL PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Civilization has developed so quickly and impressively in the last 500 years because it was guided by the ideology of *capitalism*. The first 5,500 years of civilization's history had very slow progress, but an acceleration took place in the following

Table 16-5. Characteristics of kinds of capitalism in 1500-2000+

Kind of Capitalism	Purpose	Civilization Wave	Dominant Civilizations	Pioneer Country	Other Country	Other
Merchant 1500-1800	Merchant's profit	Agricultural	Western, Eastern, Islamic	Venice	Holland	
Commercial 1600s+	Company's profit	Agricultural Industrial	Western-West	Great Britain	The U.S.	
Robber Barons' 1840s-1910s	Baron's profit	Industrial	Western-West	The U.S.		
Regulated 1910s-1933	Stake Holders' profit	Industrial	Western-West	The U.S.		
Family 1900s+	Family's profit	Agriculture	Western-Latin	Mexico	Latin America Russia	
Managed 1933-1943	Individual's income	Industrial	Western-West	The U.S.	Germany	
Social 1945-1990s	Business' Profit and Labor's Better off	Industrial Information	Western-West	The U.S.		Post-war Western Europe
State 1917-1991	State's gain	Agricultural Industrial	Eastern Chinese Western-Central	Soviet Union China	North Korea	
Crony 1989+	Politicians' and Tycoons' profit	Industrial Information	Western-Central	Poland	Russia	Transformation from state to liberal capitalism
Authoritarian 1991+	Businessmen's profit	Industrial Information	Eastern, Chinese	China Russia	Singapore	
Managerial 1990s+	CEOs' Profit, No Social Considerations	Industrial Information	Western-West	The U.S.		
Global 1900s+	Investors' & CEOs' profit	Industrial Information	Western-West	The U.S.	UK Germany Sweden	
Super 2000+	Capitalism wins over democracy	Industrial Information	Western-West	The U.S.		More concern for efficiency than equity

500 years, when clever individuals learned how to profit from production, commerce, and trade. But first of all, they had to develop certain kinds of economic activities, and it took some time.

Table 16-5 indicates that one can recognize at least 13 kinds of capitalism. Two kinds are now extinct, “Robber Barons” and Crony. But the other 11 kinds played or still play a strong role in economic development. Even State Capitalism (centrally planned), which was ineffective in practice, provided a sort of laboratory experiment, albeit one that if possible should be avoided. The latter’s 74 years of experimentation are like a minute in human civilization’s history.

Social Capitalism (1945-90) was developed in the West during the Cold War in response to the “workers”-oriented economy in the Soviet Block. Social capitalism divides the concept of economy into two tiers: A participatory group of society working functionally in an upper economy (tier one) and an underlying economy of dependent poor communities and criminal elements (tier two). Tier one generally comprises upper and middle classes while tier two represents many low-wage workers, impoverished persons, mentally ill individuals, and criminals. Social capitalism posits that providing tier two with the means to participate in the market would discourage tier two from completely dropping out of the system, hence, causing major disruptions to the market. A larger and more inclusive market is a more efficient and more stable market. Social capitalism practiced is capitalism with a social conscience. The positive messages sent from a business will only increase profits as consumers and investors see the actions and take it into account when purchasing goods from the company. One of the greatest achievements of the twentieth century was a social contract that provided far more economic security and prosperity for working Americans than had existed in any previous period.

Managerial Capitalism (1990s+) is characterized as an enormous transfer of wealth from public investors to the hands of CEOs regardless of their


performance. (In fact, it could be argued that in many cases, payouts are inverse to success since many have been occasioned by the firing of the recipients.) Some critics contend that managers have received a disproportionate share of the fruits of corporate success, leaving too little for workers or owners (Bogle, 2005). The “golden parachutes” given to top management reveal that America’s business leaders can pursue their own personal goals through the securities markets, designed for *owners’ capitalism*. Managerial capitalism replaced “relationships” among people by faceless “transactions” with management. These transactions are intensified by automation (bar code readers, unmanned customer service, etc.), which in addition eliminates routine human skills. Inequality in society increases in managerial capitalism. The winner-takes-all strategy lowers or even eliminates institutional loyalty, diminishes informal trust among workers, and weakens institutional knowledge, which are the key attributes of social capital. In such a manner, the social has been diminished; capitalism remains (Sennett, 2006). The permanent quest for better performance of capitalism increases the application of technology, which needs rather new skills than old ones. The “old” veteran workers were formerly a key source of competency; vice versa, many view these individuals as the obstacle to it. This new kind of economy based on managerial capitalism operates “flexible” (programmed) production/service, which has tremendous personal consequences of work. Eventually, it leads to the corrosion of character because it triggers the loss of anchorage and self-understanding of the employee (Sennett, 1998).

Global Capitalism (1990s+) In the past decade, globalization—meaning the rise of market capitalism around the world—has undeniably contributed to America’s new economy boom. It has created millions of jobs from Malaysia to Mexico and a cornucopia of affordable goods for Western consumers. It has brought phone service to some 300 million households in developing

nations and a transfer of nearly \$2 trillion from rich countries to poor through equity, bond investments, and commercial loans. It has helped to topple dictators by making information available in once sheltered societies. The Internet is

now poised to narrow the gulf that separates rich nations from the poor even further in the decade to come (Business Week, 2000). Globalization has brought huge overall benefits, but earnings for most U.S. workers—even those with college

Figure 16-9. A tree of capitalism's evolution as the driving force of civilizational dynamics



degrees—have been falling recently; inequality is greater now than at any other time in the last 70 years. Whatever the cause, the result has been a surge in protectionism. According to Scheve and Slaughter (2007), to save globalization, policy-makers must spread its gains more widely. The best way to do this is by redistributing income. Instead of implementing that kind of policy, the beneficiaries of *global capitalism* are converting it to *super capitalism*.

The newer concept of super capitalism (particularly in the U.S.) is emerging from managerial and global capitalisms and is intervening into every facet of democracy, exemplified by the dominance of corporate lobbyists, lawyers, and public relations professionals over the entire political process, pouring in the corporate money that engulfs the system on a day-to-day basis, making it almost impossible for citizens' voices to be heard (Reich, 2007, p. 211).

The tree of capitalism's idea evolution is presented in Figure 16-9. It shows relationships among those 13 kinds of capitalism and, most importantly, it allows thinking about the future of capitalism.

If capitalism was driving the economic development of civilization in the last 500 years, can it drive civilization forever? It proved to be very effective in creating a rising standard of living, but not necessarily in increasing human happiness. In fact, it can be a source of human unhappiness, particularly for the weak and the people unprotected by resources.


According to Maddison (2001), world economic performance was very much better in the second millennium of our era than in the first. Between 1000 and 1998, the world population rose 22-fold and per capita income 13-fold. In the previous millennium, the population rose by a sixth and per capita GDP fell slightly. The sec-

Table 16-6. World population (millions) and rates of growth (0-3000 A.D.)

	0	1000	Growth Rate 0-1000	2000	Growth Rate 1000-2000	3000 Projec- tion	Assumed Growth Rate 2000-3000	Economic System for 2000-3000
World	231	268	1.16	6,000	22	8,000	1.3	Ecologism (Self-sustainable Economy)
World						12,000	2	Authoritarian Capitalism
World						18,000	3	?
World						30,000	5	?
World						60,000	10	?
World						132,000	22	Unregulated Capitalism
World						180,000	30	Unregulated Capitalism

Source: For years of 0-2000 based on Maddison (2001), p. 241. Years beyond 2000, projected by the Author.

Figure 16-10. The power of modern capitalism



ond millennium comprised two distinct periods. From 1000 to 1820, the upward movement in per capita was slow; for the world as a whole the rise was about 50%. Growth was largely “extensive” in character. Most of it went to accommodate a four-fold increase in population. Since 1820 (the Industrial Revolution), world development has been much more dynamic and more “intensive.” Per capita income rose faster than the population. By 1998, it was 8.5 times as high as in 1820 and the population rose 5.6-fold. However, if one looks at the Western civilization (Western Europe, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and Japan, their average per capita income grew nearly four times as fast as the average of the rest of the world. The differential continued between 1820 (the In-

dustrial Wave) and 1998 (the Information Wave) when per capita income of the first group rose 19-fold and 5.4- fold for the second. This means that *commercial capitalism* and *Robber Baron’s capitalism*, as well as *regulated capitalism* and *social capitalism*, partially even *managerial capitalism* or in general *modern capitalism*, has been very effective (Figure 16-10).

Every kind of capitalism acted or acts within given civilizational constraints, and is rather more focused than it is universal. Perhaps two of its kinds; *regulated*, *social* and *global*, can be considered as universal. However, at this moment (2008) *global* and *super capitalisms* need to be regulated; otherwise, it will be rejected by a mood of *protectionism* among people who cannot share globalization’s gains.

What kinds of regulations are needed to protect civilization's population in the third millennium? As table 16-6 illustrates, in the first millennium, when *capitalism* was absent, the population growth was almost stagnant (there are some exception of course such as China). In the second millennium, when *capitalism* was active, the population grew 22-fold.

If *capitalism* continues its spectacular performance, the world's population in the third millennium may reach anywhere between 8 and 180 billion people. However, the former level will probably be reached in the middle of the 21st century. Other projected population levels by the end of the current millennium would have inconceivable effects. For example, if the rate growth of the second millennium remains the same in the third millennium, then the population will reach 132 billion. But due to "progress," if this rate is even bigger in the present millennium than in the last one, the world's population will be 180 billion. As is analyzed in Chapter XVII, the ecosystem can support only 8 to 9 billion people. This means that current kinds of *capitalism* must be rejected if we think to continue humanity's confinement to Earth, a small planet with limited strategic resources. Only a new economic system—*ecologism* can support a *self-sustainable economy*, which would be possible if the world's population increases only 1.3-fold by the end of the third millennium, we *must* return to the *pre-capitalistic* period of civilization!

The presented characteristics and evolution of *capitalism* allow for the following observations:

1. The present kinds of *capitalism* are not optimal to protect civilization's population, which will grow in the third millennium beyond Earth's supply of strategic resources (see Chapter XVII).
2. Perhaps *global and super capitalisms* should be re-oriented into *authoritarian capitalism*, which will control the optimal distribution of strategic resources among population,

still in religion-oriented civilizations. At the current level of agreement among world populations, this solution looks like utopia. Also, *authoritarian capitalism* has a tendency to become *crony capitalism*, since people in power abuse it for personal benefits. Furthermore, with the exceptions of the Chinese, Buddhist civilizations, other cultures reject *authoritarian* control of society.

3. The future of civilization is in the following implemented solutions:
 - a. Birth control accepted by religions and people
 - b. Strategic resources replaced by man-made ones
 - c. Universal-complementary civilization is implemented (Chapter VII)
 - d. Other planets are searched for possible colonization and supply of strategic resources. (However, it is unlikely we will use other planets for this; they have gravity wells, which make exports prohibitively expensive. More likely we would use ships with hydrogen-oxygen engines, powered by water from the carbonaceous chondrite asteroids, to mine the metallic asteroids in the belt. They are closer and have no gravity wells to speak of. Even then, the initial investment in such a project would be staggering).

Can these strategies be implemented? They should, but it will not happen soon or perhaps even ever. This would mean that the future of civilization is in wars, epidemic attacks, and catastrophes, which will "automatically" control the world's population into small growth or even expected decline. Should this statement not be written and published, because is too pessimistic? But the scientific approach cannot be based on optimism or pessimism, only on the truth.

CONCLUSION

The coming generation will be a period of great change—political as well as economic. The evolution toward multi-country economic integration will continue—especially in the Atlantic region. Today's economic powers will continue to dominate the coming years. China may well become the world's largest individual economy. However, the United States, which is very likely to integrate with larger groups of countries into a massive free-trade area, will continue to be the dominant world economic force.

As China's wealth grows, it will become a more diverse economy. It will eventually become the massive consumer market of which western marketers have long dreamed. Its entry into the World Trade Organization and advancement up the economic-development scale will greatly increase its role in international trade and investment. As this development progresses, China will also become an important competitor in world markets to NAFTA, Europe, and Japan. The present China is more complementary to these markets than competitive; its success is primarily that of a supplier. However, it is already learning rapidly and advancing technologically. More and more, it is copying modern products and methods. In coming years, as Japan did so successfully before it, China will begin innovating. Then civilization relationship will be competitive rather than complementary.

China will evolve into an industrial power. Its economic strength will give it the potential for much greater political influence in the world. But the extent to which these developments occur will depend upon whether China will apply *authoritarian* or *democratic capitalism*. In any event, China will continue to grow as an economic force. In coming years, it will likely develop very strong heavy industries and strong automotive and electronic industries. Given its size, its impact may be much greater than was even Japan's in its heyday.

The future of *capitalism* depends on how humans will "slow down" its performance, which supports a too-fast population growth, which exceeds the ecosystem's capacity. A new economic system is needed—*ecologism*—which would control a *self-sustainable economy*. In order to develop and implement this system, humans must be more knowledgeable, socially wise and skillful in applying information technology, which offers many optimization-providing solutions.

A. Further Research Directions

- Investigate how civilizations in the 21st century impact international relations.
- Investigate how civilizations in the 21st century impact foreign trade and the integration of markets under the form of free-trade zones.
- Investigate rules and laws of intra- and inter-civilization political and commercial relations.

B. Research Opportunities

- The research opportunity is in applying a civilization concept in analyzing foreign political and commercial relations and predicting their potential for success or failure.

C. Additional Ideas

- The tendency of world politics for "integrational" movements in the 21st century goes beyond the boundaries of regions and nations. A new tendency is to protect "borders of a civilization" within a region, city, or nation. It evolves from so-called ethnic communities and has a global reach. It develops new kinds of loyalty and patterns of behavior.

D. Rationale

- Mass production of goods and profits requires a strategy of permanent growth. Nowadays, a real global economic growth of 3% a year sets the global economy at the level of \$45 trillion in 2005 (World Bank, 2007, p. 16). If this pace is sustained, the economy will reach \$75 trillion in 2030. This vast expansion of output will have major consequences for production and consumption, particularly of food, water, and energy, and will stress the environment even more drastically. As a result of the growth strategy, businesses need larger markets, going beyond national boundaries. Therefore, such alliances of so-called free-trade zones, large-scale complexes like NAFTA, or CAFTA, and the EU have been created in the second part of the 20th century. At the beginning of the 21st century, there are 26 FTAs and five more are planned (Inter-American, Inter-Atlantic-TAFTA, Inter-Asian, and others). If one looks more carefully at these zones, they look like the civilization criterion (a civilization as a competitive unit) is integrating their members. Therefore, the nation criterion, which has been working since the French Revolution, is being replaced in the 21st century by the civilization criterion. It is important to be aware of this and be prepared for inter-civilization trade principles and tendencies.

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